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Abstract 
Gist-based processing has been proposed to account for robust false memories in the 
converging associates task. The deep encoding processes known to enhance verbatim 
memory also strengthen gist memory and increase distortions of long-term memory 
(LTM). Recent research demonstrates that compelling false memory illusions are 
relatively delay-invariant, also occurring under canonical short-term memory (STM) 
conditions. To investigate the contribution of gist to false memory at short and long 
delays, processing depth was manipulated as participants encoded lists of four 
semantically-related words and were probed immediately following a filled 3-4 second 
retention interval or approximately 20 minutes later in a surprise recognition test. In two 
experiments, the encoding manipulation dissociated STM and LTM on the frequency, 
but not the phenomenology, of false memory. Deep encoding at STM increases false 
recognition rates at LTM, but confidence ratings and Remember/Know judgments are 
similar across delay and do not differ as a function of processing depth. These results 
suggest that some shared and some unique processes underlie false memory illusions 
at short and long delays. 
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Introduction 
The susceptibility of memory to distortion has been empirically studied using the 
converging associates or DRM paradigm (Deese, 1959; Roediger & McDermott, 1995), 
in which unstudied semantic associates (“related lures”) to lists of studied words are 
later endorsed as studied items. The ease with which false memories can be reliably 
induced using the DRM procedure is impressive, but it also invites the practical question 
of how the incidence of such memory errors can be controlled. Previous DRM studies 
have tested the effects of varying word list construction (McDermott, 1996; Robinson & 
Roediger, 1997), encoding instructions (Rhodes & Anastasi, 2000; Thapar & 
McDermott, 2001; Toglia, Neuschatz, & Goodwin, 1999), testing conditions (Coane & 
McBride, 2006; McDermott, 1996), and even providing explicit warnings about the 
nature of the word lists and related lures (Anastasi, Rhodes, & Burns, 2000; Gallo, 
Roberts, & Seamon, 1997; McDermott & Roediger, 1998; Neuschatz, Payne, Lampinen, 
& Toglia, 2001). The persistent finding is that while false memory rates can be 
attenuated through such manipulations, they are rarely if ever eliminated. 
Recent research from our lab has further demonstrated the recalcitrance of the 
false memory illusion by documenting its occurrence within several seconds of studying 
brief four-item lists (Atkins & Reuter-Lorenz, 2008; Flegal, Atkins, & Reuter-Lorenz, 
2010; see also Coane, McBride, Raulerson, & Jordan, 2007). Flegal et al. (2010) used a 
new experimental paradigm to directly compare false memories in the same participants 
under short-term memory (STM) and long-term memory (LTM) conditions. Participants 
viewed lists of four semantic associates and were probed immediately following a filled 
3-4 second retention interval (i.e., STM) or approximately 20 minutes later in a surprise 
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recognition test (i.e., LTM). A unique advantage to this task design is its ability to 
dissociate retrieval processes operating under STM and LTM conditions, for items 
studied in the same encoding period under equivalent encoding conditions.  
Based on traditional models postulating separable memory systems, Flegal et al. 
(2010) expected that false recognition rates would be higher under canonical LTM 
conditions than at STM testing. In particular, the subspan memory load, brief retention 
interval, and surface-level coding associated with STM were expected to minimize false 
recognition. In contrast, the semantic, meaning-based coding thought to characterize 
LTM, coupled with the greater memory load and longer delay, were expected to 
maximize false recognition. The results defied these expectations, however.   
Measurements of both quantity (the relative incidence of false recognition) and quality 
(the accompanying phenomenology, or subjective experience) of memory distortions did 
not reliably differ between short-term and long-term testing. The finding of stable false 
memory effects across time is inconsistent with predictions based on models of multiple 
memory systems, suggesting instead that the generation of false memories is due to the 
operation of the same processes regardless of delay.   
These results pose a challenge to at least one prominent theoretical account of 
false memory. “Fuzzy trace” theory (Brainerd & Reyna, 2002; Reyna & Brainerd, 1995) 
proposes that two types of information are encoded into memory in parallel: verbatim, 
item-specific traces which faithfully record surface features and details of an experience, 
and gist representations which store general themes or semantic content. For accurate 
memory of semantically-related material, verbatim and gist traces reinforce each other, 
but gist traces also promote false memory for related information, especially when 
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unopposed by shorter-lasting verbatim traces. According to this theory, access to both 
types of traces declines over time, but gist traces are slower to fade. Thus, verbatim 
traces should be readily available to oppose gist traces during the STM test, thereby 
minimizing the incidence of false memories. At longer delays, the weakened verbatim 
traces should leave the more durable gist-based traces unopposed, thereby increasing 
the incidence of false memories. Yet Flegal et al. (2010) observed false memory effects 
that were relatively delay-invariant.  
In our previous study (Flegal et al., 2010), no explicit encoding instructions were 
given, so the strategies participants adopted were likely aimed merely at supporting 
short-term recognition because the LTM test was unbeknownst to them. Consequently, 
gist-based coding may have been weak and merely incidental, which would also explain 
the relatively low memory performance observed at long-term testing. A more rigorous 
test of the fuzzy trace theory in the context of our hybrid DRM task can be rendered with 
more systematic control of encoding strategies. This is the aim of the present study. 
According to the levels-of-processing theory (Craik & Lockhart, 1972), 
information encoded at a deep, semantic level will be better remembered than 
information encoded at a shallow, perceptual level. However, prior research using the 
DRM paradigm has shown that deep processing of semantic associates (e.g., making 
pleasantness ratings, or concrete/abstract decisions) increases the rate of false recall 
(Rhodes & Anastasi, 2000; Toglia et al., 1999) and false recognition (Thapar & 
McDermott, 2001) of related lure words, and also increases accurate memory for 
studied items. Fuzzy trace theory claims that deep, meaning-based encoding 
strengthens durable gist traces, accounting for the resultant increases in both accurate 
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memory and false memory observed in DRM studies. In the present study, we further 
test predictions from fuzzy trace theory by assessing the effects of encoding 
manipulations on false memories at short as well as long delays. At short-term testing, 
even if gist traces are better established with deep encoding, coexisting verbatim traces 
should still be strong and oppose false memory. At long-term testing, verbatim traces 
will be relatively weak, leading to minimal opposition and instead increased reliance on 
gist, and a corresponding increase in false memory. An additional prediction is that the 
effects of encoding manipulations on accurate memory will be minimal at STM, but the 
codes established at this same encoding episode will show a dramatic effect on 
accuracy when later probed in LTM, with deep encoding potentially bringing LTM 
accuracy levels close to what is seen when probing at STM. 
The prediction that an encoding manipulation will dissociate memory accuracy 
between short-term and long-term testing has support from recent studies using a novel 
“levels-of-processing span” paradigm. Rose et al. (2010) found that visual, phonological, 
or semantic processing of to-be-remembered words did not influence immediate recall 
accuracy (i.e., STM), but a classic levels-of-processing effect emerged on a delayed 
recognition test (i.e., LTM), where accuracy was highest for words that received deep 
encoding, and lowest for words that received shallow encoding. A follow-up study (Rose 
& Craik, 2012) replicated the LTM results and showed that a levels-of-processing effect 
at short-term testing could be induced only when an immediate recall test was 
unexpected, in the context of incidental encoding that discouraged the surface-level 
coding and active maintenance processes characteristic of STM. Taken together, these 
data challenge strict models of unitary memory systems, by demonstrating the 
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involvement of different processes under STM and LTM conditions. However, while the 
work of Rose and colleagues is informative about effects of processing depth on 
accurate memory at short and long delays, it is unclear whether false memory would be 
similarly influenced. In the present study, we re-examine the effects of encoding 
manipulations on false memory focusing specifically on whether they will operate 
similarly in STM and LTM, or if their effects will dissociate these systems. In addition to 
assessing memory accuracy, we include phenomenological measurements to acquire 
converging evidence about reliance on verbatim versus gist memory. 
The phenomenology of memory distortions is evident in compelling, but illusory, 
feelings of recollection often found to accompany false memories for semantically-
related lure words, at long delays in typical DRM tasks (Lampinen, Neuschatz, & Payne, 
1998; Lampinen, Ryals, & Smith, 2008; Payne, Elie, Blackwell, & Neuschatz, 1996). In 
our previous study (Flegal et al., 2010), surprisingly, such “illusory recollection” effects 
were observed at short delays as well: measures of both confidence and recollective 
experience for falsely recognized lure words were statistically equivalent under STM 
and LTM conditions. Gist-based processing offers the best account for the stable rates 
of false memory previously demonstrated in our paradigm under unconstrained 
encoding instructions, although high-confidence and recollection-based responses 
would be expected to decline over time along with the availability of verbatim traces. 
Here our goal is to further interrogate the subjective experience of false recognition by 
experimentally controlling processing depth. If deep encoding promotes gist-based 
responding at long-term testing, then decreased access to verbatim detail should be 
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apparent in confidence ratings and Remember/Know judgments associated with false 
memory illusions.  
 
Experiment 1 
Method 
Participants 
 32 individuals (18-24 yrs old; M = 19.8) participated for course credit or payment. 
Eight additional participants were tested but excluded from analysis for recognition 
accuracy scores > 2.5 standard deviations from the mean at STM and/or LTM, math 
task accuracy < 0.70 (during the STM trial retention interval), or computer malfunction. 
Research protocols were approved by the University of Michigan Institutional Review 
Board, and all participants provided written informed consent.  
Materials 
The memory sets were 96 lists of four semantically related words, all associates 
of a common theme word (e.g., SLEEP for the list containing the associates nap, doze, 
bed, awake) which served as the probe on every trial. As depicted in Figure 1, the three 
probe types were: related lure, the unstudied theme word associated with a studied list; 
unrelated lure, an unstudied theme word associated with a nonpresented list; and 
target, the theme word associated with, and present in, a studied list (replacing one of 
the four associates). Theme words (e.g., sleep) were inserted into studied lists on target 
probe trials, rather than using a studied associate (e.g., bed) as the probe, because 
theme words in the DRM paradigm are unique in that the other memory set items 
converge upon them. The ordinal position of the item replaced by the theme word was 
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balanced across target probe trials. Theme words as probes appeared only once during 
the experiment; no list was probed in both STM and LTM trials. 
The 96 lists were divided into four groups of 24 four-word lists (Groups A-D) 
equated in mean backward associative strength (M = 0.40) derived from the University 
of South Florida Free Association Norms (Nelson, McEvoy, & Schreiber, 1998). Probe 
type was counterbalanced with word lists across participants, so that for one quarter of 
all participants, lists in Group A were paired with related lure probes, B with unrelated 
lure probes, and C with target probes. Theme words associated with Group D lists 
served as the unrelated lure probes. Because the 24 lists in Group D were not 
presented, this resulted in a total of 72 STM trials (see Design and Procedure, below).  
Each of the four groups of 24 lists was further divided into two subgroups of 12 
lists, following the same parameters, to balance the status of each list as short-term 
versus long-term memoranda across participants. Thus, for half of the participants in 
each of the four counterbalanced orders, the first subgroup of lists from each group 
(e.g., A1) was probed during the STM trials, and the second subgroup of lists (e.g., A2) 
during the LTM trials; the assignment was reversed for the other half of the participants. 
This procedure ensured that all participants encountered the same probes – all theme 
words, but in different contexts – as related lures, unrelated lure probes, or target 
probes, and as STM or LTM probes (see also Flegal, et al., 2010). 
Finally, the blocked order of encoding instructions was counterbalanced across 
participants, so that half of the participants in each of the orders experienced an ABBA 
design beginning with “shallow” encoding instructions, and the other half experienced a 
BAAB design beginning with “deep” encoding instructions.  
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Design and procedure 
The four-word memory sets were probed either within the same trial (i.e., STM) 
or in a surprise recognition test following completion of all STM trials (i.e., LTM), in order 
to examine short-term and long-term memory distortions concurrently and within-
subjects (see Figure 1). As in our previous study (Flegal et al., 2010), each STM trial 
started with a brief study period followed by a 3,000-4,000 ms retention interval filled 
with a math equation verification task, then (a) the probe word to respond to (yes or no) 
followed by a four-point confidence rating (very low, somewhat low, somewhat high, or 
very high), or (b) cues for two arbitrary button presses with corresponding response 
mappings (for memory sets that would subsequently be probed at LTM). Instead of 
simultaneous presentation of the entire memory set at the beginning of each STM trial, 
however, here the four words were presented serially (for 250 ms each, with a 2,000 ms 
inter-stimulus interval) to allow for individual encoding judgments. 
Shallow encoding instructions directed participants to “count the total number of 
ascenders and descenders in each word,” thereby requiring attention to the 
morphological characteristics of the memory set items (always presented in lower-case 
letters). Participants made a four-point response to each of the four words on these 
trials, indicating the sum of its ascenders and descenders: 0, 1, 2, or 3+. Ascenders (b, 
d, f, h, k, l, and t) and descenders (g, j, p, q, y) were defined for participants in a practice 
session prior to the start of the experiment. 
Deep encoding instructions directed participants to “rate how much you like the 
meaning of each word,” thereby requiring attention to the semantic characteristics of the 
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memory set items. Participants made a four-point liking response to each of the four 
words on these trials: dislike a lot, dislike a little, like a little, or like a lot. 
The STM trials consisted of 72 trials divided into four blocks, two for each set of 
encoding instructions. Instructions for both encoding conditions were introduced before 
starting the first STM block. Half of the participants began with a shallow encoding block 
and the other half began with deep encoding block. All participants received a 1-min 
break between the second and third blocks. Each block of trials started with a reminder 
screen describing the encoding instructions and response options, and an identifying 
colored border (shallow = blue; deep = pink) remained on the screen throughout the 
block. Participants completed 18 trials in each of the 4 blocks, presented in random 
order. Of the 9 trials in each block probed at STM, 3 were of each probe type (related 
lure, unrelated lure, and target). Thus, a total of 36 memory sets were probed at STM. 
A 2-min break followed completion of the STM trials, then participants were 
informed about, and given instructions for, the LTM recognition test. Each participant 
completed 72 LTM trials, 36 of which tested memory sets that were not probed at STM 
(12 each – 3 from each STM block – of the related lure, unrelated lure, and target probe 
type). Additionally, to match the proportion of correct “yes” responses between STM and 
LTM testing, there were 12 trials of studied associates from memory sets that were 
probed at STM (never including theme words from target probe trials), and 24 trials of 
unstudied, unrelated foils, matched for frequency and word length with the corpus of 
theme words used in the experiment. Each LTM trial started with the probe word to 
respond to (by indicating whether or not it had appeared during the STM trials: yes or 
no) followed by a four-point confidence rating. 
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Results 
Encoding time 
The mean response latency to memory set items in the STM trials (i.e., the 
amount of time to make encoding judgments) was significantly longer in the shallow 
encoding condition (M = 1,001 ms, SEM = 26 ms) than in the deep encoding condition 
(M = 809 ms, SEM = 26 ms), t(31) = 5.69, p < 0.001. Although this may indicate 
systematic differences in the average amount of encoding time, it should be noted that 
the memory set items were present on the computer screen for the same duration (250 
ms each) in each condition. The latency difference is also in the opposite direction from 
that which might predict better memory associated with deeper encoding and longer 
encoding time: response times were actually faster for liking ratings (deep processing) 
than letter counting (shallow processing). Nevertheless, as the data below indicate, 
deeper processing led to better memory, suggesting that the perceptual demands of the 
shallow encoding task simply made it more time-consuming. 
Accuracy 
Mean math task accuracy during the STM trial retention interval was 0.89; it did 
not significantly differ between shallow encoding (M = 0.89) and deep encoding (M = 
0.88) blocks. As shown in Table 1, a classic levels-of-processing effect was evident for 
studied items, as correct recognition of target probes in the deep encoding condition 
remained nearly as high on LTM trials as on STM trials, compared to a steep drop in 
target probe accuracy from STM to LTM in the shallow encoding condition. Paired 
comparisons confirmed that the encoding manipulation reliably influenced accurate 
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memory at long-term testing (t(31) = 6.12, p < .001) but not short-term testing (t(31) = 
1.55, p = .13) where hit rates were high in both conditions. The encoding condition 
(shallow, deep) × delay (STM, LTM) interaction for target probe accuracy was highly 
significant, F(1,31) = 21.40, p < .001, ηp2 = .41. 
At short-term testing, there was a significant false memory effect (the difference 
between “yes” responses to unstudied, related lure probes and unstudied, unrelated 
lure probes) for both shallow encoding (M = 0.16) and deep encoding (M = 0.11). At 
long-term testing, however, the false memory effect no longer reliably differed from zero 
for lists that received shallow encoding (M = 0.04), while the false memory effect for lists 
that received deep encoding was more than double in size at LTM (M = 0.27) compared 
to STM. Thus, although the incidence of false recognition did not differ between 
encoding conditions at STM (t(31) = 0.98, p = .33), it was significantly greater in the 
deep encoding than the shallow encoding condition at LTM (t(31) = 2.96, p < .01).  
The baseline (unrelated lure probe) false alarm rate at LTM was equivalent for shallow 
and deep encoding conditions (see Table 1), indicating that the significant difference in 
the false memory effect at LTM was driven by a disproportionate increase in false 
alarms to related lure probes belonging to lists that received deep encoding at STM. 
This time-dependent effect of levels of processing on false memory formation was 
evident in a significant lure type (related, unrelated) × encoding condition (shallow, 
deep) × delay (STM, LTM) interaction, F(1,31) = 10.16, p < .01, ηp2 = .25.  
Phenomenological experience 
 Stable levels of confidence in false recognition across time were observed in 
both encoding conditions. As shown in Figure 2, confidence in “yes” responses to 
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related lures did not change from STM to LTM for lists that received shallow encoding 
(t(13) = 1.38, p = .19) or lists that received deep encoding (t(14) = 0.49, p = .63). This 
finding replicates and extends results from our previous study under unconstrained 
encoding instructions (Flegal et al., 2010). In contrast, but also consistent with our 
earlier work, confidence in “no” (correct) responses to related lures significantly 
decreased from short-term to long-term testing in both the shallow (t(30) = 3.43, p < .01) 
and deep (t(30) = 3.37, p < .01) encoding conditions. The response (yes, no) × delay 
(STM, LTM) interaction for related lure confidence ratings was marginally significant in 
both the shallow (F(1,12) = 3.92, p = .07) and deep (F(1,14) = 4.26, p = .06) encoding 
conditions. Thus, the effects of levels of processing did not dissociate STM and LTM on 
participants’ confidence in their responses to related lure probes. For all correct 
responses, however, there was a significant main effect of encoding condition (F(1,29) = 
33.87, p < .001), such that confidence ratings were higher overall for lists that were 
studied under deep than under shallow encoding instructions. 
 
Discussion 
 In summary, Experiment 1 revealed that the effect of delay on the incidence of 
false recognition depends on encoding strategy. A direct comparison of short-term and 
long-term testing indicates that deep encoding preserved accurate memory across 
delay and increased false memory at LTM (consistent with results from DRM studies; 
e.g., Thapar & McDermott, 2001), while the encoding strategy manipulation had minimal 
effects at STM (consistent with results from the levels-of-processing span task; Rose, et 
al., 2010). Confidence ratings for false recognition of related lures were statistically 
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equivalent at short and long delays (see also Flegal, et al., 2010), and did not differ as a 
function of encoding strategy. In other words, false memories were endorsed with 
similar levels of confidence whether they occurred after short or long delays, and 
regardless of how deeply their associates were encoded. 
 Because evidence suggests that deep processing strengthens both verbatim and 
gist memory traces, independent contributions of the two types of memorial information 
are difficult to discern in the data from Experiment 1. While verbatim traces fortified by 
deep encoding might be expected to oppose the illusion of false memories at short-term 
testing, it is possible that confidence ratings are not sufficiently sensitive to such 
differences (Lampinen et al., 1998). In an effort to better capture differences in false 
memory phenomenology than the confidence ratings used in Experiment 1, 
Remember/Know judgments (Gardiner, 1988; Tulving, 1985; Yonelinas, 2002) were 
employed in Experiment 2. Recollection of vivid, specific details of a past experience is 
considered to be the hallmark of “remember” judgments, made on the basis of verbatim 
memory traces, while “know” judgments are associated with feelings of familiarity that 
lack episodic detail, and may arise from gist memory instead (Geraci & McCabe, 2006). 
In the DRM paradigm, manipulations designed to increase semantic processing (e.g., 
presenting word lists blocked by theme rather than randomly intermixed) lead to 
increases in measures of false memory phenomenology (Dewhurst, Bould, Knott, & 
Thorley, 2009; Mather, Henkel, & Johnson, 1997). Deep, semantic processing is also 
known to promote recollection-based responses in accurate memory (Gardiner, 1988; 
Rajaram, 1993). If processing depth can reveal delay-dependent effects on the 
incidence of false memory, as shown in Experiment 1, then we would expect a similar 
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dissociation for rates of “illusory recollection”, in that gist-based responding in the LTM 
recognition phase should result in fewer remember responses to related lures due to a 
greater likelihood of know responses.   
In Experiment 1, rates of accurate memory in the deep encoding condition were 
nearly equivalent at short-term and long-term testing, which fuzzy trace theory would 
attribute to verbatim traces at STM and gist traces in the absence of verbatim traces at 
LTM. If gist memory contributes more to retrieval decisions at longer delays for lists that 
receive deep encoding, then we would expect estimates of false recollection to be 
greater at LTM than STM. Our previous study (Flegal et al., 2010) found that when 
encoding strategies were unconstrained, the proportion of remember responses 
assigned to related lure false alarms was relatively delay-invariant, and the present 
study leverages the encoding strategy manipulation to more closely examine predicted 
contributions of enduring gist traces to false recognition over time. 
 
Experiment 2 
Method 
Participants 
 36 individuals (18-28 yrs old; M = 19.4) participated for course credit or payment. 
Seven additional participants were tested but excluded from analysis for recognition 
accuracy scores > 2.5 standard deviations from the mean at STM and/or LTM, math 
task accuracy < 0.70 (during the STM trial retention interval), or post-experiment 
questionnaire responses indicating failure to understand the Remember/Know 
distinction.  
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Design and procedure 
 The method was the same as Experiment 1 except that remember/know/guess 
judgments replaced confidence ratings. Following each “yes” response to a probe word, 
participants were prompted to indicate with a button press whether they remember the 
probe word was in the memory set (recollecting something distinctive about studying the 
word), they know the probe word was present (recognizing the word without retrieving 
specific details of its study), or their response had been a guess. As in our previous 
study (Flegal et al., 2010), detailed instructions explaining the Remember/Know 
distinction were adapted from Rajaram (1993). To equate the number of responses 
required on each trial, a display of three boxes appeared following each “no” response 
to a probe word, prompting an arbitrary button press response.  Additionally, 
participants made three-point (letters count: 0, 1, or 2+; liking rating: dislike, like a little, 
or like a lot), rather than four-point, responses for individual encoding judgments. 
Furthermore, to minimize the influence of knowledge of multiple encoding 
strategies from the start of the experiment, the blocked order of encoding instructions 
was counterbalanced across participants so that instructions for the first half of STM 
trials were given before the first block, and instructions for the second half of STM trials 
were given between the second and third blocks. Half of the participants in each of the 
orders experienced an AABB design beginning with shallow encoding instructions, and 
the other half experienced a BBAA design beginning with deep encoding instructions. 
All participants completed a total of four STM blocks, two with each set of encoding 
instructions. 
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Results 
Encoding time 
The mean response latency to memory set items in the STM trials was slightly 
but significantly longer in the shallow encoding condition (M = 809 ms, SEM = 20 ms) 
than in the deep encoding condition (M = 771 ms, SEM = 21 ms), t(35) = 2.17, p < 0.05, 
replicating the pattern from Experiment 1. 
Accuracy 
Mean math task accuracy during the STM trial retention interval was 0.90; it did 
not significantly differ between shallow encoding (M = 0.91) and deep encoding (M = 
0.90) blocks. As in Experiment 1, a classic levels-of-processing effect was evident for 
studied items, as correct recognition of target probes in the deep encoding condition 
remained nearly as high on LTM trials as on STM trials, compared to a steep drop in 
target probe accuracy from STM to LTM in the shallow encoding condition (see Table 
1). Again, as expected, the encoding manipulation reliably influenced accurate memory 
at long-term testing (t(35) = 7.99, p < .001) although here it also had an effect at short-
term testing (t(35) = 2.37, p < .05). The encoding condition (shallow, deep) × delay 
(STM, LTM) interaction for target probe accuracy was highly significant, F(1,35) = 30.55, 
p < .001, ηp2 = .47. 
At short-term testing, there was a significant false memory effect for both shallow 
encoding (M = 0.19) and deep encoding (M = 0.11). At long-term testing, the false 
memory effect was slightly (but not significantly) reduced for lists that received shallow 
encoding (M = 0.15), while the false memory effect for lists that received deep encoding 
was almost three times larger at LTM (M = 0.31) compared to STM.   
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Although the false memory effect was significantly greater than zero in both 
encoding conditions at both delays, the incidence of false recognition at LTM was higher 
for lists that were studied under deep than under shallow encoding instructions (t(35) = 
2.83, p < .01), consistent with the results from Experiment 1 and prior studies from the 
DRM literature. In contrast, the incidence of false recognition at STM was greater in the 
shallow encoding than the deep encoding condition; an effect in this direction was 
shown numerically in Experiment 1, but here the difference was significant (t(35) = 2.66, 
p = .01). At LTM, the baseline (unrelated lure probe) false alarm rate was equivalent for 
shallow and deep encoding conditions (see Table 1), indicating that the significant 
difference in the false memory effect at LTM was driven by a disproportionate increase 
in false alarms to related lure probes belonging to lists that received deep encoding at 
STM. As in Experiment 1, this time-dependent effect of levels of processing on false 
memory formation was evident in a significant lure type (related, unrelated) × encoding 
condition (shallow, deep) × delay (STM, LTM) interaction, F(1,35) = 13.16, p < .001, ηp2 
= .27. 
Phenomenological experience 
Consistent with the stable confidence in related lure false alarms in Experiment 
1, normalized estimates of false recollection in both encoding conditions were relatively 
time-invariant. Although the absolute incidence of remember responses to related lures 
actually increased with longer delays, this shift was confounded with a rising baseline 
false alarm rate, and thus a normalized incidence measure was calculated as the 
proportion of remember responses to related lures out of the total proportion of yes 
responses to related lures (see also Flegal et al., 2010). As shown in Table 2, this 
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measure did not change from STM to LTM for lists that received shallow encoding (t(15) 
= 0.87, p = .40) or lists that received deep encoding (t(16) = 0.91, p = .38). Likewise, 
there was no significant main effect of delay on this measure collapsed across encoding 
condition (F < 1). Thus, the subjective experience of “remembering” an item that had 
never been studied appeared equally robust at short and long delays. Furthermore, and 
replicating our earlier work, the normalized incidence of remember responses to related 
lures was lower than that for remember responses to target probes at both STM and 
LTM, for lists studied under both shallow and deep encoding instructions (all ps < .05). 
Thus, in both encoding conditions, participants were able to differentiate between true 
and false memories on the basis of recollective experience. For all remember 
responses to target probes, a putative index of verbatim memory, there was a 
significant main effect of encoding condition (F(1,35) = 47.02, p < .001, ηp2 = .57), 
indicating that rates of “true” recollection were higher at both delays for studied items 
that received deep rather than shallow encoding at STM. 
These results replicate findings of stability in the proportion of false memories 
associated with “remember” phenomenology from STM to LTM, as reported in Flegal et 
al. (2010), and are consistent with similar effects found in confidence ratings from 
Experiment 1 in the present study. Nevertheless, the normalized estimates of false 
recollection from Experiment 2 should be interpreted cautiously because relatively few 
participants assigned remember responses to related lure false alarms, especially at 
short-term testing, and thus the sample size was restricted to n = 10 for the encoding 
condition (shallow, deep) × delay (STM, LTM) overall ANOVA.  
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Discussion 
As in Experiment 1, accuracy data revealed time-dependent effects of processing 
depth on false memory formation. Deep encoding preserved accurate memory across 
delay and increased false memory at LTM (consistent with results from DRM studies), 
although in Experiment 2 the encoding strategy manipulation also affected the incidence 
of false recognition at STM, in the opposite direction to LTM. A possible reason why 
deep encoding would reduce false memory at short delays, relative to shallow encoding, 
is that deeper processing is assumed to strengthen both verbatim and gist traces. Thus, 
under STM conditions, the verbatim representations enhanced by deep encoding would 
oppose the simultaneously enhanced gist representations. Under LTM conditions, with 
decreased access to verbatim traces, the levels-of-processing effect would be reversed 
as longer-lasting gist traces strengthened by deep encoding lead to an increase in false 
memory. 
Normalized rates of remember responses to related lures replicated our earlier 
findings of relatively delay-invariant measurements of false memory phenomenology at 
short and long delays (Flegal et al., 2010), which did not differ as a function of encoding 
strategy in the present study (see Table 2). In other words, false memories were 
accompanied by statistically equivalent rates of “illusory recollection” whether they 
occurred after short or long delays, and regardless of how deeply their associates were 
encoded. 
 
General Discussion 
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 In two experiments, a levels-of-processing manipulation was found to dissociate 
the frequency, but not the phenomenology, of false recognition between short-term and 
long-term testing. Processing depth had little effect on recognition performance at short 
delays, but deep encoding (relative to shallow encoding) elevated the rates of both 
accurate and false memory at longer delays. The finding from Experiment 1 that effects 
of an encoding strategy manipulation at STM emerged only at LTM testing is similar to 
the dissociation that Rose and colleagues (2010) observed in their levels-of-processing 
span task. The direction of the deep processing effects that appeared at LTM in both 
Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 (i.e., increases in false recognition as well as accurate 
recognition) also reproduces and extends published findings (Thapar & McDermott, 
2001), demonstrating that encoding influences on false memory in the long term can 
originate even from four-word lists of semantic associates studied under STM 
conditions.   
What this study uniquely demonstrates, however, is that regardless of whether 
processing is shallow or deep, false recognition errors occur within seconds of 
encoding, and the phenomenological experience of those illusory memories is relatively 
delay-invariant, despite their greater incidence at longer delays after deep encoding. 
Self-reports of confidence in false alarms to related lures in Experiment 1, and 
normalized rates of remember responses to related lures in Experiment 2, did not 
significantly differ between short-term and long-term testing, or as a function of 
processing depth. These data provide further support for the claim that compelling false 
memory illusions can arise within seconds of encoding, as shown by Flegal et al. 
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(2010), while also demonstrating conditions under which the incidence of short-term and 
long-term memory distortions are dissociable.  
Whereas our earlier work found relatively delay-invariant false memory rates 
when encoding strategies were unconstrained, the present results imply that there may 
still be different processes underlying memory formation, monitoring, or both, at STM 
and LTM, when encoding strategies are constrained by instructions (see also Rose & 
Craik, 2012). By experimentally controlling processing depth and tracing its effects on 
the quantity and quality of semantic memory errors over time, the present study 
represents an important advancement in constraining theoretical accounts of false 
memory. Rates of false recognition at short and long delays were dissociated more by 
deep than shallow processing, consistent with predictions based on fuzzy trace theory 
that long-lasting gist traces strengthened by deep, meaning-based encoding will exert 
their effects predominantly under LTM conditions, when the availability of verbatim 
traces has been diminished. The stable false memory effect observed in our previous 
study (Flegal et al., 2010), where encoding instructions were not experimentally 
controlled, may have been a consequence of variability in depth of processing 
strategies engaged (and subsequently averaged) across participants. 
However, the absence of a levels-of-processing effect on confidence ratings or 
“remember” responses to related lures appears at odds with gist-based explanations of 
false memory from the domain of LTM. If verbatim traces are strengthened by deep 
encoding, then their availability in STM would be expected to oppose false recollection 
at short delays, yet we found that phenomenological measurements were not affected 
by processing depth. Perhaps the simultaneous enhancement of gist traces through 
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deep encoding increases the probability of falsely attributing episodic details to related 
items (i.e., “content borrowing”; Lampinen, Meier, Arnal, & Leding, 2005), thereby 
counteracting the protective influence of verbatim memory in the short term. Even if that 
were the case, the deterioration of verbatim traces over time would predict encoding-
related differences in subjective experience to emerge at longer delays, contrary to the 
pattern of results in the present study.  
An alternative interpretation for selective dissociations between short-term and 
long-term memory distortions is offered by the activation-monitoring account of false 
memory (Gallo & Roediger, 2002; Robinson & Roediger, 1997; Roediger, McDermott, & 
Robinson, 1998). According to this theoretical framework, false memories arise from the 
associative activation of lure words related to studied items and the failure of monitoring 
processes to identify the source of memory signals. While activation is likely affected by 
delay, and by processing depth, the consequences of monitoring success or failure may 
be less time-dependent. That is, monitoring failures, whether they occur under STM or 
LTM conditions, may result in equally compelling false memory illusions. However, such 
an account cannot readily explain why, if the subjective experience of false recognition 
results from transient associative activation, phenomenological measurements would 
not measurably decline over time. 
As Rose and Craik (2012) have proposed, the distinction between STM and LTM 
may be best understood from a processing approach. Rather than representing 
separable memory systems, it is likely that short-term and long-term testing rely on 
some shared, and some unique, memory processes. The degree of time-invariance 
observed in measures of memory performance and phenomenology will therefore 
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depend upon the amount of overlap between the encoding, maintenance, and retrieval 
processes required by the chosen STM and LTM tests. This reasoning is compatible 
with other unitary models of memory (e.g., Cowan, 1999; Nairne, 2002), which posit that 
STM and LTM are supported by common processes but allow for factors such as states 
of activation or the availability of different retrieval cues to vary over time. 
The dissociation between effects of processing depth on false recognition at 
short-term and long-term testing observed in the present study suggests that our 
encoding manipulation revealed different processes operating under STM and LTM 
conditions (similar to the results reported by Rose et al., 2010). Such an interpretation is 
consistent with fuzzy trace theory, which states that the predominance of verbatim 
retrieval at short delays gives way to gist retrieval at longer delays. However, it is 
unclear how the involvement of different memory processes at STM and LTM can 
account for the stability observed in false memory phenomenology. Contrary to 
predictions that deep encoding would reduce false recollection by strengthening both 
short-lasting verbatim traces and long-lasting gist traces lacking in episodic detail, 
normalized rates of remember responses to related lures were not significantly affected 
by encoding strategy or delay. From a processing approach, this finding may point to a 
memory process contributing to subjective experience which is susceptible to distortion 
and, unlike verbatim and gist-based processing, common to STM and LTM tests. 
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Table 1 Mean recognition proportions in Experiments 1 and 2. 
 
 Experiment 1 
 Shallow Encoding  Deep Encoding 
 STM LTM  STM LTM 
Probe type “Yes” “Yes”  “Yes” “Yes” 
Related 
lure 
.18 .32  .16 .53 
Unrelated 
lure 
.02 .28  .05 .26 
Target .82 .53  .87 .84 
 Experiment 2 
 Shallow Encoding  Deep Encoding 
 STM LTM  STM LTM 
Probe type “Yes” (R/K/G) “Yes” (R/K/G)  “Yes” (R/K/G) “Yes” (R/K/G) 
Related 
lure 
.19 (.03/.06/.09) .30 (.10/.10/.10)  .13 (.03/.06/.04) .49 (.18/.16/.15) 
Unrelated 
lure 
.00 (.00/.00/.00) .15 (.02/.05/.07)  .02 (.00/.00/.02) .18 (.01/.06/.11) 
Target .85 (.57/.18/.09) .52 (.25/.15/.13)  .92 (.71/.18/.03) .90 (.71/.13/.06) 
 
 
Processing depth and false recognition in STM and LTM     31 
 
  
Table 2 Experiment 2 proportion of “Remember”, “Know”, and “Guess” responses out of 
total proportion “Yes” responses. 
 
 Shallow Encoding 
 STM  LTM 
 “Remember” “Know” “Guess”  “Remember” “Know” “Guess” 
Probe type M SEM M SEM M SEM  M SEM M SEM M SEM 
Related 
lure .21 .08 .27 .07 .52 .08 
 .28 .06 .31 .06 .41 .08 
Unrelated 
lure .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 
 .13 .06 .36 .09 .52 .09 
Target .63 .06 .25 .05 .12 .03  .45 .06 .29 .05 .26 .05 
 Deep Encoding 
 STM  LTM 
 “Remember” “Know” “Guess”  “Remember” “Know” “Guess” 
Probe type M SEM M SEM M SEM  M SEM M SEM M SEM 
Related 
lure .29 .11 .45 .10 .25 .09 
 .36 .06 .28 .05 .36 .06 
Unrelated 
lure .00 .00 .00 .00 1.00 .00 
 .05 .04 .37 .08 .58 .09 
Target .77 .04 .19 .03 .04 .01  .80 .04 .14 .03 .06 .02 
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Figure 1 Experiment 1 design. During the study phase, a four-point judgment (shallow 
encoding or deep encoding, depending on task block) is made for each item. 
Subsequently, each four-word list is probed only once; either immediately following a 3-
4 second filled retention interval (short-term memory), or in a surprise recognition test 
after all lists are encoded (long-term memory). 
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Figure 2 Experiment 1 mean confidence ratings by encoding condition, probe type, and 
delay (error bars = SEM; C = correct response). 
 
 
 
 
 
